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vladik@utep.edu, olgak@utep.edu
Abstract
In his 1940s empirical study of evasive aircraft actions, N. Wiener, the
father of cybernetics, founds out that the pilot’s actions follow a Wienertype-process. In this paper, we explain this empirical result by showing
that such evasive actions are indeed optimal against the 1940s anti-aircraft
guns.
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Introduction

Wiener’s empirical data. Many techniques that form the basis of modern
communication, signal processing, and control were developed in the 1940s by
MIT’s Norbert Wiener, as part of his cybernetics. Cybernetics is where the now
ubiquitous abbreviation “cyber” – ranging from cyberinfrastructure to cyberbullying – comes from. Wiener’s work was boosted during the Second World
War, when he worked on automatic control devices for anti-aircraft guns; see,
e.g., [1, 4].
Wiener used statistical optimization techniques to develop a ﬁring strategy
that would, on average, be most eﬃcient against the pilot’s random evasive
maneuvers. To formulate the corresponding optimization problem, it is necessary to know the probabilities of diﬀerent evasive trajectories ⃗x(t). To ﬁnd
these probabilities, N. Wiener, with his collaborator Julian Bigelow, a pilot
by training, set up a ﬂight simulator and recorded the corresponding evasive
trajectories.
As a result, for the simpliﬁed situation with no restriction of airplane maneuvering, the pilot’s evasive trajectories followed the Browning motion (what
is now known in Mathematics as a Wiener process) [3], when the change
⃗x(t + ∆t) − ⃗x(t)
1

can be in any spatial direction with equal probability, and the current change
does not depend on the previous changes. In more realistic situations, when they
took into account that the airplane’ velocity ⃗v (t) cannot be changed abruptly,
the change in velocities ⃗v (t + ∆t) − ⃗v (t) followed the Wiener process.
Comment. Based on this information, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow developed an
optimal controller. For this particular application, the resulting improvement
in eﬃciency was very low, around a few percents, so this controller was not
implemented. However, in many other applications, similar controllers were
spectacularly successful.
Question. An interesting question is: why did the pilots use Wiener-processtype evasive actions? Are such evasive actions optimal – or are more eﬃcient
evasive maneuvers possible?
In this paper, we use simple game theory to show that the Wiener-processtype evasive actions are indeed optimal.

2

Formulation of the Problem

Only 2-D coordinates are important. First, let us recall that from the
viewpoint of the anti-aircraft gun, what is important is a 2-D location of an
airplane: if the airplane travels in the 3-rd dimension, along the line of ﬁre, it
does not help it evade the shells. Because of this, we will only consider 2-D
locations and velocities.
An idealized situation when an aircraft can arbitrarily change its
velocity: towards the exact formulation of the problem. Let us ﬁrst
consider the simpliﬁed setting, when it is assumed that an aircraft can arbitrarily
change its speed ⃗v (t), as long as this speed does not exceed the limit v0 imposed
by its engine. In this case, if at the moment t, the aircraft was at location ⃗x(t),
by the next moment of time t + ∆t it can travel any distance not exceeding
v0 · ∆t. Thus, at the moment t + ∆t, the aircraft can be anywhere in the disk
D of radius v0 · ∆t centered at the point ⃗x(t). Selecting an evasive maneuver
means selecting a probability distribution ρp (⃗x) on this disk, a distribution that
determines with what probability the plane will be at a given location.
The adversary observes the position ⃗x(t) and the type of the plane, so the
adversary knows the plane’s maximum velocity v0 and thus, knows the disk D
of possible locations of the plane at the next moment of time. Once the disk
is known, the adversary selects his own probability distribution ρs (⃗x), distribution that describes with what probability the shell is aimed towards a future
location ⃗x.
The goal of the pilot is to evade the shell, i.e., to minimize the probability
of being hit, while the goal of the gunner is to hit the plane, i.e., to maximize
this probability. A shell hits the plane if it is suﬃciently close to the plane, i.e.,
if the position ⃗xs of the shell is within a certain small distance ε > 0 from the
position ⃗xp of the plane. For each position ⃗xs of the shell, the plane is hit if
this plane is within a circle C of radius ε with a center in ⃗xs . The probability
2

∫
for a plane to be in this circle is equal to C ρp (⃗y ) d⃗y . Since the circle is small,
the value ρp (⃗y ) is practically constant within this circle, so this integral can be
approximated as Aε · ρp (⃗xs ), where Aε = π · ε2 is the area of this circle.
For each location ⃗xs of the shell, the probability of a plane being hit is
thus equal to Aε · ρp (⃗xs ). The probability of a shell being in this location is
proportional to ρs (⃗xs ). Thus, by using the formula
∫ of complete probability, we
can compute the probability of being hit as Aε · D ρs (⃗x) · ρp (⃗x) d⃗x.
This is a zero-sum game: a win for the plane – successful evasion of the shell
– is a loss for the adversary. So, according to game theory (see, e.g., [2]), the
optimal strategy for a pilot is a minimax strategy, i.e., a strategy that minimize
the worst-case loss. For this strategy, the worst-case value
∫
J(ρp ) = Aε · max
ρs (⃗x) · ρp (⃗x) d⃗x
ρs (⃗
x)

D

is the smallest possible. Let us show how to solve this optimization problem.
Solving the resulting problem. The above integral is the expected (mean)
value of the probability density function ρp (⃗x) over the distribution ρs (⃗x). The
expected value of any
∫ function is always smaller than or equal to the maximum
of this function, so D ρs (⃗x) · ρp (⃗x) d⃗x ≤ max ρp (⃗x). Thus,
⃗
x∈D

∫
ρs (⃗x) · ρp (⃗x) d⃗x ≤ max ρp (⃗x).

max
ρs (⃗
x)

⃗
x∈D

D

On the other hand, if we take a distribution ρs (⃗x) which is located, with probability 1,∫ at a point ⃗x where the function ρp (⃗x) attains its maximum, then we
will get D ρs (⃗x) · ρp (⃗x) d⃗x = max ρp (⃗x). Thus,
⃗
x∈D

∫
ρs (⃗x) · ρp (⃗x) d⃗x = max ρp (⃗x),

max
ρs (⃗
x)

⃗
x∈D

D

and therefore the value J(ρp ) is equal to Aε · max ρp (⃗x):
⃗
x∈D

J(ρp ) = Aε · max ρp (⃗x).
⃗
x∈D

Minimizing J(ρp ) is hence equivalent to minimizing the value max ρp (⃗x). We
⃗
x∈D
∫
def
know that D ρp (⃗x) d⃗x = 1. Here, for every ⃗x, we have ρp (⃗x) ≤ m = max ρ(⃗x),
⃗
x∈D
∫
∫
thus, 1 = D ρ(⃗x) d⃗x ≤ D m d⃗x ≤ m · A(D), where A(D) is the area of the
1
. The equality is
region D. From 1 ≤ m · A(D), we conclude that m ≥
A(D)
possible only when there is equality for all ⃗x in the inequality ρp (⃗x) ≤ m, i.e.,
when ρp (⃗x) = m for all ⃗x. This is exactly a uniform distribution on the set D –
and of course, this distribution should be independent on what was done in the
past.
3

Thus, in the simpliﬁed case, we indeed conclude that the Wiener process is
an optimal way to perform evasive actions.
A more realistic formulation of the problem. A more realistic description
of evasive actions must take into account that the velocity ⃗v (t + ∆t) at the next
moment of time t + ∆t cannot be too much diﬀerent from the velocity ⃗v (t) at
the previous moment of time, there is a limit on acceleration |⃗a(t)| ≤ a0 . In
general, once we know the initial location ⃗x(t), the initial velocity ⃗x(t), and the
acceleration ⃗a(t), we can determine the position ⃗x(t + ∆t) at the next moment
of time as
1
⃗x(t + ∆t) = ⃗x(t) + ⃗v (t) · ∆t + · ⃗a(t) · (∆t)2 .
2
Here, the initial location ⃗x(t) and the initial velocity ⃗v (t) are ﬁxed, and the
acceleration ⃗a(t) can take any value for which |⃗a(t)| ≤ a0 .
Thus, the set of locations ⃗x(t + ∆) is a disk D centered at the point ⃗x(t) +
1
⃗v (t)·∆t with radius ·a0 ·(∆t)2 . Similarly to the simpliﬁed case, we can describe
2
possible evasive actions by a probability density ρp (⃗x) located on this disk, and,
similarly to the simpliﬁed case, we can conclude that the optimal evasive action
corresponds to the uniform distribution on this disk. In this optimal solution,
the change in velocity ⃗v (t + ∆t) − ⃗v (t) = ⃗a(t) · ∆t is uniformly distributed on
the disk of radius a0 · ∆t – and is independent on the previous trajectory of the
plane.
Thus, in this realistic case, we indeed conclude that the Wiener process for
velocities is indeed an optimal way to perform evasive actions. So, Wiener’s
empirical data indeed corresponds to optimal evasive action.
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